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1 Introduction
In democratic societies voters delegate the decision on public spending and taxation to elected politi-
cians. The way politicians cater to the interest of voters depends, among other things, on the rule under
which they are elected and the separation of powers in legislative decision-making. Previous research on
comparative political economy suggests that majoritarian and proportional rules differently incentivize
politicians to spend on public goods and targetable transfers (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, Milesi-Ferretti et
al., 2002). Relatedly, presidential systems provide incentives to spend less in aggregate relative to parlia-
mentary systems (Tabellini et al., 1997, 2000).
Apart from political institutions, legislative outcomes also depend on the fiscal environment in which
politicians operate. A characteristic feature of decentralized public finance is that transfer income ac-
counts for a significant share of local resources. Transfer programs are tied to economic and social traits
of jurisdictions which are partly under the control of politicians and, hence, create fiscal incentives on
their own.
The incentive effects inherent to electoral rules and fiscal transfers are separately analyzed in the lit-
erature. The literature on electoral rules does not account for fiscal transfers and their incentive effects,
while the literature on fiscal equalization does not account for the electoral rule under which politicians
are elected and their interaction with equalization systems. This paper empirically analyzes whether
electoral rules differ with respect to the incentive effects of fiscal equalization using a reform of the elec-
toral system and a reform of the equalization scheme in the German state of Lower Saxony. In detail,
we analyze whether municipalities in the state of Lower Saxony adjust their tax policy differently to a
reform of the equalization system, depending on whether voters elect municipal legislators under pro-
portional rule (council-manager system) or whether they also directly elect a mayor under majoritarian
rule (mayor-council system). Our results show that legislators are differently responsive to changes in
fiscal incentives across electoral systems. The tax rate response in a mayor-council system is 50 per cent
larger compared with a council-manager system.
The reason why equalization transfer exert an incentive effect at all is related to the formula used to
calculate entitlement payments. The prime motivation for equalization is to ensure that citizens have
access to a comparable amount of public services at comparable cost irrespective of their place of resi-
dence in a country (Boadway, 2004). One way to achieve the principle of a "social citizenship" is through
a transfer formula which compares the fiscal need of a jurisdiction with its fiscal capacity (so-called fis-
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cal capacity equalization). The latter is generally computed as the amount of tax revenues a jurisdiction
could collect if it were to levy a tax on its tax base equal to, e.g., the average tax rate of all jurisdictions.
Thus, it is a hypothetical rather than the actual tax rate of jurisdictions which is used to compute equal-
ization payments. The adjustment eliminates incentives to lower the tax rate in order to downward ma-
nipulate fiscal resources, but still leaves the tax base as a target to influence through tax rate choices.
Previous literature shows this dependence implies a positive tax price effect (Smart, 1998). A tax increase
in a jurisdiction lowers its tax base and, hence, the fiscal capacity. Transfer income rises in response. As
to policy relevance, such a system of fiscal equalization determines a large share of local public resources
in a variety of countries including Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Italy and Germany. At the same time,
these countries use different electoral rules at the local level. The observation points to the question
of wether the heterogeneity in electoral rules has practical implications for the working of equalization
schemes in local public finance.
The fundamental problem of identifying the influence of electoral rules on local fiscal outcomes is
that municipalities in a state typically operate under the same electoral regime. Even if municipalities
could opt for one of the other regime, the political system may be endogenous to preferences for spend-
ing, if for example voters in countries that prefer less public spending also prefer, for some reasons, a
majoritarian system. Hence, seeing less spending in a majoritarian system might not be taken as evi-
dence of a causal relation between majoritarian systems and the size of public spending with causality
running from the electoral system to spending. Rather, the choice of the two may be exclusively deter-
mined by voter preferences.1 A different possibility of exploiting heterogeneity in political systems is
to compare fiscal outcomes across nations. In fact, empirical analyses on the economic effects of elec-
toral rules are mainly at the national level - see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2003). It is evident, however,
that drawing causal inferences from the associations in cross-country data is a precarious exercise for
the reason explained above. Cross-sectional differences in government spending may reflect omitted
factors related to national culture and institutions that are correlated with electoral rules.
In the empirical analysis we address the identification problem in two ways. First, our units of obser-
vation are municipalities in a single state which operate under relatively homogenous socio-economic
and political conditions. Second, we make use of two recent reforms in the state of Lower Saxony (Nieder-
sachsen) as natural experiments to empirically identify the effect of interest. The first reform became
effective as of 1996 and changed the electoral rule in municipalities. The second reform became effec-
1See Acemoglu (2005) for a more thorough treatment of endogeneity issues in comparative political economy.
3
tive as of 1999 and involved changes in the equalization formula. The two reforms allow us to employ
quasi-experimental methods to draw causal inference.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the relevant literature. Section 3
explains the details of the two reforms, followed by a description of the data in Section 4. Sections 5 and
6 explain the econometric methods used in the paper and shows the results. Finally, Section 7 draws
some concluding remarks.
2 Literature
Empirical work on the incentive effects of equalization programs has evolved only recently. Baretti et al.
(2002) provide evidence that the equalization system among German states implicitly taxes tax revenues
allocated to states through revenue-sharing arrangements. States do not have explicit taxing powers.
Thus, the effect of fiscal equalization on tax policy cannot be identified therein. Hayashi and Boadway
(2001) report empirical results consistent with the idea that Canadian provinces conform in their tax rate
setting to the tax rate of the province of Ontario which predominantly determines the average provincial
tax rate used to compute the standard fiscal capacity in the Canadian equalization formula. Smart (2007)
extends their approach and finds a robust effect of equalization on the tax policies of grant-receiving
governments in Canada. Dahlby and Warren (2003) find a similar incentive effect for Australia. Buettner
(2006) uses variation in equalization rates and in the sharing rate in vertical revenue-sharing arrange-
ments in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg to estimate the incentive effect of transfers. He finds
evidence of a positive incentive effect. Egger, Koethenbuerger and Smart (2010) uses a large-scale reform
of equalization rates in the German state of Lower-Saxony as a natural experiment to identify a causal
effect of fiscal capacity equalization on municipal tax policy. The aforementioned literature abstracts
from the issue of how political institutions and fiscal equalization intertwine.
There is an evolving empirical literature on political economy which compares economic outcomes
across political regimes.2 Previous empirical work on the comparison of majoritarian and proportional
system has been done by, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), com-
paring spending outcomes between majoritarian and proportional systems and by Persson et al. (1997,
2000), comparing spending outcomes in presidential systems versus parliamentary systems. Empirical
work on the comparison of council-manager systems (proportional, parliamentary representation) and
2Theoretical work on the comparison between electoral rules is more fulminant. See, for instance, Lizzeri and Persico (2001,
2005) for recent contributions and Austen-Smith and Bank (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a review.
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mayor-council system (having elements of a majoritarian, presidential system) include Egger, Koethen-
buerger and Smart (2007) and Coate and Knight (2009).3 They look at spending outcomes in German and
US municipalities, respectively. The papers do not lean themselves to the issue of how incentive effects
of fiscal equalization play out under different electoral rules.4
The omission might not be surprising. Identification of a causal effect requires quasi-randomization
in two dimensions, i.e. of electoral rules and of equalization rates, which are rarely available in empirical
work.
3 Reforms
Our analysis builds on two reforms which allows us to use quasi-experimental techniques to draw causal
inference. The two reforms were phased in at different times. The first reform became effective as of 1996
and changed the electoral rule in municipalities. Municipalities transitioned to the new electoral system
over a period of twelve years. The second reform became effective as of 1999 and involved immediate
changes in the equalization formula for all municipalities. We will describe the details of the reforms
below.
Equalization reform: Municipalities in Germany receive equalization transfers or contribute to the
equalization fund, depending on their measured fiscal wealth. The exact definition of the equalization
scheme differs across states. But the common characteristic is that entitlement payments are calculated
by comparing the fiscal need of a municipality with its fiscal wealth. The prime determinants of the fis-
cal need measure are population size and a level of per-capita spending. Fiscal wealth comprises the
tax base of the profit tax for which municipalities can independently set the tax rate. However, it is not
the actual amount of tax revenues which determines fiscal wealth. The tax base is multiplied by a hy-
pothetical tax rate, which the state government selects, to arrive at a measure of fiscal capacity; that is,
an amount of tax revenues which can be collected if the municipality were to levy the hypothetical tax
rate. Any deficiency between fiscal needs and fiscal capacity is at least partly compensated by transfer
payments.
To understand the incentives for local tax policy induced by the transfer system, it is useful to con-
3See also Baqir (2002) who analyzes the link between the size of legislature and total spending in US cities, operating under
either a major-council system or council-manager system.
4There is a literature on the political economy of fiscal flows. For instance, Johansson (2003) and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-
Navarro (2008) analyze the effects of partisan behavior on interregional transfer flows. Electoral rules make no appearance.
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sider a snapshot of the equalization formula used in calculating transfers:
T (B)=α (N −B(t )) 0≤α≤ 1, (1)
where N denotes a level of target spending (fiscal need), t denotes the business tax rate, and B(t ) is the tax
base, which is negatively sloping, B′(t )< 0. α is the rate at which deficiencies between the level of target
spending and fiscal capacity are equalized. Differentiating T (B) with respect to the tax rate, transfer
payments increases following a rise in the tax rate. The reason is that the tax base, i.e. the measure of
fiscal capacity, shrinks in response to the higher tax rate. Higher taxes thereby lure more transfers to
the local budget. As such, the positive transfer response reduces the cost of taxation, leading to higher
tax rates (Smart, 1989).5 In practice, the transfer formula is typically non-linear with different linear
segments, each characterized by (1).
Putting the aforementioned hypothesis of a positive incentive effect of fiscal-capacity equalization
to a test requires a sizeable change in the equalization rate at which deficiencies are compensated. Such
a reform of the equalization system has been implemented in the state of Lower Saxony in 1999. The
reform was initiated by a ruling of the state supreme court in November 1997 which declared the initial
system unconstitutional and requested the implementation of a new system as of 1999. The core of the
municipal transfer system in Lower Saxony is (i) a system of regular equalization grants, which compen-
sate for a fraction of the amount by which each municipality’s measured taxation capacity falls short of
its targeted spending level or fiscal need, and (ii) a system of supplementary equalization grants, which
establish a floor level of spending in each municipality, and equalize 100 per cent of deficiencies up to
the floor. The reform prescribed changes in the different equalization rates. Prior to the reform, the reg-
ular equalization transfer compensated 50 per cent of deficiencies in capacity below the target level. In
the 1999 reform, the regular equalization rate was increased to 75 per cent, while the threshold fraction
of the target below which supplementary equalization is paid was decreased.
Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 1 expresses the relationship between a municipality’s own fiscal capacity B and its equaliza-
tion transfers T (B) in both the pre-reform and post-reform periods in Lower Saxony. The kinked line
segment ADNG is the constraint which obtains in the pre-reform period: capacity deficiencies are fully
compensated by transfers when B ≤ θ0N , so the constraint has slope -1 in this interval; 50 per cent of
5See also Koethenbuerger (2000) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006).
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capacity deficiencies are compensated when θ0N < B ≤ N , so the slope of the constraint is -0.5 in this
interval; and no equalization transfers are paid when B > N , the slope of the constraint is thus zero to
the right of N . The post-reform budget constraint is represented by the kinked line segment ACNH.
The effect of the reform was to increase the fraction of capacity deficiencies compensated by regular
equalization transfers to 75 per cent and so to increase the slope of the constraint by 0.25 (in absolute
value) in the intermediate interval, while reducing the threshold at which supplementary equalization
was paid commensurately to θ1N . For governments with tax capacity in excess of need, operating on
segment NG, no equalization payments were received before or after the reform. In the post-reform pe-
riod, however, such municipalities were required to pay 20 per cent of excess tax capacity to the state
government, operating now on the segment NH with slope -0.2. Such a payment operates exactly like a
negative equalization grant with an equalization fraction of one-fifth.
Thus the reform resulted in a rather stark change in the extent to which marginal changes in local
resources B are compensated through the formula. Municipalities may be classified into three groups
based on their equalization status prior to the reform. Group 1, corresponding to segment CD of the pre-
reform budget constraint, faced a decrease in equalization fraction of 25 percentage points following the
reform, while Groups 2 and 3, corresponding to segments DN and NG, faced increases in the equalization
fraction of 25 and 20 percentage points, respectively. According to theory then, tax rates among the
former group of municipalities are predicted to fall, compared to those of the other two groups. In the
empirical analysis we will lump municipalities in Groups 2 and 3 together, looking at how their tax rates
reacted relative to the tax rates of municipalities in Group 1.
Electoral reform: The second reform entailed a change in the electoral rule for municipal elections
in Lower Saxony. Prior to the reform, municipalities operated under a council-manager system which
was introduced by the British military government after World War II. The political system draws on the
British local government system and features three political institutions: the council, the mayor, and the
municipal manager. The size of the council ranged from 8 to 65 members (depending on the popula-
tion size of the municipality) and council members were elected under single-district, proportional rule.
Elections took place every 5 years. The political power exclusively lay with the council. The members
decided on the fiscal affairs of the municipality and appointed high-level political employees of the ad-
ministration. The council elected a mayor for whom the city charter defined a representative role, with-
out any formal authority. For the task of administration, the council nominated a manger. The manger
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was head of administration and in charge for the daily operation of bureaucracy. It was nominated for
12 years and accountable to the council.
The manager-council system was the predominant form of municipal decision making in the North-
ern states of Germany, while the states of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg adopted a mayor-council
system.6 These systems co-existed for nearly 50 years. In the 1990, politicians questioned the adequacy
of the mayor-manager system. Experience has shown that such a system may result in legislative "grid-
lock" at a time when council fragmentation increased. Also, it was held that the position of a honorary
mayor was no longer appropriate, only absorbing resources without offering significant benefits for the
electorate (Gissendanner and Kersting, 2005).
In 1996, the state of Lower Saxony amended its municipal charter legislation to introduce direct
election of mayors, chosen in community-wide majoritarian elections that take place concurrently with
council elections. The mayor is thereby politically independent from the council and a move by the
council to recall the mayor must be approved by at least half of the electorate. Besides introducing di-
rect elections for the mayor, the reform involved a substantial change in the balance of power between
the council and the mayor. The mayor is the head of administration; a function which was assigned to
a nominated manager in the pre-reform system. The council has no longer authority to nominate top-
level employees in the administration, including high-level political administrators (civil servants who
serve for 8 years). These arrangements imply that the mayor has a wide range of control in the admin-
istration. To facilitate decision-making, the council nominates members for an intermediary executive
body which is chaired by the mayor and in which the mayor has the sole right to propose legislation
(Gissendanner and Kersting, 2005).
The new electoral system was phased in gradually among municipalities in Lower Saxony over a
period of twelve years, following expiration of the long-term contract with the municipality’s manager.
Hence, at the time the new equalization rates become effective, some of the municipalities already oper-
ate under the new mayor-council system. It is this feature of the reform that permits us to compare the
incentive effects of the reform across the two electoral regimes. Since the municipality mangers’ con-
tract is honored, the timing of the transition appears to be as good as random, and so does the electoral
reform status of municipalities at the time the new fiscal equalization system was phased in.
6The mayor-council system and the council-manager system are also the predominant form of city government in the US.
See Svara (1990).
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4 Data
We employ annual data on municipalities in the state of Lower Saxony over the time period 1994 - 2004.
In order to guarantee a clean design for the identification of the reform effects, we restrict the sample
by eliminating all municipalities which transitioned to the new electoral regime between 1999 and 2004.
This leads to a total number of 351 municipalities included in our analysis out of all 1022 municipalities
in the state of Lower Saxony. In the remaining sample, municipalities have either transitioned to the
new electoral system at the time the equalization reform became effective or have not transitioned to it
until 2005. Given the sample choice, the electoral reform status of the municipalities stays the same over
the period 1999 to 2004, allowing for a clean identification of how the business tax rate of municipalities
responded over the period 1999 - 2004.
Extending the time window to years after 2004 would result in a significant loss in observations in
the non-reform group of municipalities. Since virtually all municipalities work under the new electoral
system following 2005 onwards, sufficient variation in the electoral reform status can only be exploited
from years prior to 2005. Similarly, it is not possible to exploit information from years prior to 1999, since
the number of municipalities working under the new electoral system was too small and the equalization
reform took place in 1999 (with no indication of any anticipation effects).7 The question at stake is how
municipalities working under the old versus the new electoral rule adjusted their tax rates in response to
the reform of the equalization formula.
As our dependent variable, we use data on the business tax rate (Gewerbesteuer) which, in Germany,
is set at the municipal level.8 Furthermore, we employ information about the transfer formula as illus-
trated in Figure 1 before and after the equalization reform for each municipality. We use individually-
collected data on the timing of electoral reforms at the municipal level. We also use socio-economic
characteristics of the respective municipalities such as population (inhabitants, age structure, and pop-
7See Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2010) which uses the full sample to test for anticipation effects in 1998. Note, the
state supreme court declared the old equalization system unconstitutional in 1997, with the request to implement a new system
as of 1999.
8The three most important sources of own-source tax revenues are the business tax (Gewerbesteuer), a property tax related
to agricultural land (Grundsteuer A), and a property tax levied on land not used in agriculture (Grundsteuer B). All three tax
instrument share the common feature (i) that their tax bases simultaneously enter the calculation of fiscal capacity in the
equalization system (i.e. the term B in the preceding description of the equalization system) and (ii) that a municipality can
decide on the tax rates, while the tax base is determined by federal law. In the case of the two property taxes, the tax base
is a hypothetically determined value of land (Einheitswert) which does not vary with the fiscal and economic conditions in
a municipality. Hence, on institutional grounds, there is no direct response in the property tax rates to be expected after the
change in the equalization rates. Differently, the tax base of the business tax is business profits which will vary with the level of
business taxation in a municipality. This makes the business tax rate the preferred choice of dependent variable in our empirical
analysis. Besides this, it is also the largest revenue category which municipalities can control.
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ulation density) and income per capita. Also, we account for geographical characteristics of a munici-
pality (land used for agriculture, forests, water sheds, and size of the road network). Finally, we employ
political characteristics such as the party composition of the local government (social democrats, lib-
erals, conservatives, and the greens). These socio-economic, geographical, and political characteristics
are employed as control variables to make sure that the estimated treatment effects of the equalization
reform for municipalities under the old and the new electoral regime are not confounded by omission of
these observables. Data on socio-economic, geographic, and political characteristics are available from
the respective statistical office (Statistisches Landesamt), most of it is available in a on-line data base.9
As in Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2010), we consider municipalities in Lower Saxony as being
eligible for supplementary transfers, if they have actually received such transfers in at least one year in
the pre-reform period (1994-98). As said before, we exclude municipalities which changed their electoral
system between 1999 and 2004. Then, we consider the impact of the equalization reform in municipali-
ties with electoral reform versus ones without electoral reform in 1999 relative to the control group. The
latter is defined as municipalities which were not eligible for supplementary transfers prior to 1999. Ta-
ble 1 tabulates the number of supplementary transfer eligible and non-eligible municipalities against
ones with and without electoral reform in our sample. As shown in the table, 66.7 per cent of the 351
municipalities considered here were eligible for supplementary transfers, and 38.7 per cent adopted the
electoral reform in 1999. Of those, about 25.9 percentage points were municipalities which were also
eligible for supplementary transfers. Hence, 12.8 percentage points of the municipalities which adopted
the electoral reform before 1999 were not eligible for equalization transfers. About 40.7 percentage points
of municipalities which were eligible for equalization transfers ran under the old electoral regime over
the period 1999 - 2004.
Insert Table 1 here
We may illustrate the development of the business tax rates in Lower Saxony for municipalities with
an electoral reform as of 1999 and without a reform until at least 2005 in Figure 2. The year 1999 in
the figure indicates the year in which the state-wide equalization reform was launched in Lower Sax-
ony. Also, in that year some of the municipalities have already adopted the electoral reform. The figure
indicates how business tax rates have changed in an individual year relative to the average of 1994-98
for the group of municipalities which were not eligible for supplementary transfers prior to 1999 and
9The link is http://www1.nls.niedersachsen.de/Statistik/.
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which did not undergo the electoral reform until 2005 (referred to as control group) and two treatment
groups: municipalities which were eligible for supplementary transfers, but did not undergo electoral re-
form until 2005 (displayed by the dashed line), and ones which were eligible but reformed their electoral
system in 1999 (displayed by the lower line). The upper line displays the tax rate change of the control
group. Notice that there was a difference in levels in business tax rates for those municipalities before
1999, but no difference in growth rates (see Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2010). From Figure 2, it is
quite obvious that it takes some time to adjust to a new equilibrium difference in tax rates between the
alternative groups. The gap in the tax rates between the control municipalities and the ones in the two
treatment groups increased gradually after the year of the two reforms, and the increase was particularly
pronounced for the municipalities which had adopted the new electoral system. After sluggish adjust-
ment, a new ’equilibrium’ gap in business tax rates seems to be reached at the end of the observation
period (in 2003 and 2004), since the slope coefficients of the different loci are very similar to each other.
Insert Figure 2 here
5 Estimating the reform effect: Exgogenous treatment effects of supplemen-
tary transfer eligibility conditional on electoral reform status
We start out by regressing the change in business tax rates for all municipalities between any year in
1999-2004 relative to the average year 1994-98. The analysis may be dubbed an analysis of exogenous
average treatment effects, since we ignore any possible problem of self-selection of municipalities into
supplementary transfer eligibility status for the moment.
Defining the business tax rate change of municipality i between the average year 1994-1998 and year
t = 1999, ...,2004 as ∆τi t , we will generally estimate models of the kind
∆τi t =βS,t Si +βS×E ,t Si × E˜i +Xi tγt +ui t , (2)
where Xi t is a 1×K vector of control variables which inter alia may include a constant, aforementioned
determinants of tax rate change, and the main effect of the electoral reform Ei , γt is a K×1 vector of para-
meters on Xi t , and ui t is a disturbance term. We will estimate these models for each year t = 1999, ...,2004
separately.
In regression equation (2), we employ a dummy variable Si capturing supplementary transfer eli-
gibility that is set at one for eligible municipalities (those should respond to the equalization reform in
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Lower Saxony by reducing their business tax rates according to theory) and at zero for non-eligible ones.
Then, we employ a dummy variable Ei that is set at unity from 1999 onwards if a municipality adopted
the electoral reform prior to 1999 and at zero otherwise. We want to interact the electoral reform dummy
variable with the transfer eligibility dummy variable as an additional regressor to transfer eligibility as
such. This allows us to estimate separate treatment effects of transfer eligibility for municipalities with
and without electoral reform. However, we wish to ensure that the parameter of the supplementary
transfer eligibility variable, βS,t , captures the average treatment effect for year t and the parameter of the
interactive effect, βS×E ,t captures the difference for municipalities with electoral reform to the average.
This can be accomplished by demeaning the electoral reform dummy variable in the interactive effect,
E˜i = Ei −N−1∑Nj=1 E j where N = 351 is the number of included municipalities, so that the interactive
effect Si × E˜i is zero at the mean (see Wooldridge, 2002).
The interactive effect measures the difference for municipalities which implemented an electoral re-
form to the average municipality. The corresponding parameter is to be interpreted as follows. A fraction
of 0.387 undertook the electoral reform in 1999 according to Table 1. Hence, in the interactive effect, the
demeaned variable “Electoral reform ” takes on a value of either 1−0.387= 0.613 or −0.387. Accordingly,
the average treatment effect of supplementary transfer eligibility is βS,t +0.613βS×E ,t for municipalities
with electoral form and βS,t −0.387βS×E ,t for ones without electoral reform.
Captured by the matrix Xi t in (2), we control for other determinants of tax rates in estimating those
coefficients to make sure that estimates of the treatment effects in Table 1 are not confounded by the
omission of relevant determinants of tax rates. The list of variables include the change in population, the
population density, the area of streets, and the share of elderly in the population.
Insert Table 2 here
In Table 2, we summarize the average difference of the business tax rate for municipalities by means
of regression analysis. Consistent with Figure 2, we find that the gap in business tax rates between the
considered municipalities starts widening in 1999, but differences which are significantly different from
zero at conventional levels do not appear prior to the year 2000 and mainly materialize towards the end
of the observation period. How big are the effects for the two groups? To answer this question, we need to
consider the aforementioned general thoughts about average treatment effects with interactive effects.
It turns out that the point estimate of equalization reform average treatment effect is negative for mu-
nicipalities with and without the electoral reform. The finding is consistent with the general theory on
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the incentive effects of fiscal capacity equalization (Smart, 1989)10 and in line with the empirical findings
in Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2010).11 The results differ markedly across electoral systems. The
average treatment effect on municipalities with electoral reform is −0.206 in 1999 and −0.659 in 2004.
It changes significantly from year to year until 2002 and remains quite stable from then onwards. The
corresponding effect on municipalities without electoral reform is −0.110 in 1994 and reaches −0.278 in
2004, being more than 50 per cent smaller than the response of the reform group.
In the subsequent analysis, we will account for self-selection of municipalities into supplementary
transfer eligibility.
6 Estimating the reform effect: endogenous treatment effect of supplemen-
tary transfer eligibility conditional on electoral reform status
6.1 Estimation procedures for average effects of endogenous supplementary transfer eligi-
bility
The equalization reform entails different changes in the equalization rate. Most notably, the qualitative
change in rates depends on whether municipalities are eligible for a supplementary equalization pay-
ment, i.e. whether they initially operated to the left of point θ0N on the budget line in Figure 1. These
experience a drop in the equalization rate, while the other municipalities face a higher equalization rate
after the reform. Evidently, the supplementary transfer status may be partly influenced by a municipality
and, hence, is endogenous. To the extent that factors which are related to self-selection also influence
tax policy after the reform, the change in business tax rates between the pre- and post-reform periods
will depend on this endogenous selection. The results in Table 2 might thus be biased.
Wooldridge (2002) suggests estimating the average effects of endogenous treatments (ATE), if treat-
ment effects vary according to interactive effects. One suggested procedure may be referred to as a gen-
eralized Heckman-type model which entails estimating a switching regression that accounts for self-
selectivity (Heckman, 1978). In contrast to Heckman’s original model, the one to be used here includes
two independent inverse Mills ratios, one for the treatment group (Si = 1) and one for the control group
10Municipalities which are supplementary transfer eligible correspond to the "Group 1" municipalities in our description of
the equalization reform, while non-eligible municipalities correspond to municipalities in Group 2 and 3. Hence, the former
group should have decreased the tax rate, while the latter municipalities should have increased their tax rates.
11In Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2010), we use the universe of 1022 municipalities in Lower Saxony. We equally find
an increase in the gap in tax rates between supplementary transfer eligible and non-eligible municipalities, βS,t < 0, but at a
higher level of significance. The reason why we get less significant results here is related to the reduced sample size. Redoing
regression (2) in the reduced sample without the interaction term yields similar (in magnitude and in statistical significance)
average treatment effects as in Table 2.
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(Si = 0). These are added to the list of independent variables in regression (2). To calculate the inverse
Mills ratios, one ought to estimate a probit model in a first step. The model we use is a cross section
model that is estimated on time averages for the period 1994-98. The results are available upon request.
Alternatively, the prediction of this probit model can be used to estimate the probability of Si = 1,
Sˆi , and use it as an instrument for Si in a two-stage least squares model. Similarly, the interactive term
Si × E˜i in (2) will be instrumented by Sˆi × E˜i . In subsequent analysis, we will apply both procedures.
6.2 Results
In Table 3, we summarize the results for the generalized Hecknman models, while we report the corre-
sponding findings for the instrumental variables models in Table 3 and Table 4. Qualitatively, the results
are quite similar between Tables 3 and 4. In general, the endogenous treatment effect models point to
bigger average treatment effects of equalization reform for both municipalities with and without elec-
toral reform than the exogenous treatment models in Table 2 do. However, the magnitude of the esti-
mated treatment effect of electoral reform is somewhat bigger under instrumental variables estimation.
For 2004, the estimate of the average treatment effect of municipalities with electoral reform is −1.212
in Table 3 while it is −1.438 in Table 4. The corresponding effects on municipalities without electoral
reform are −0.830 in Table 3 and −1.042 in Table 4. Hence, both procedures point to a difference in the
average treatment effects between municipalities with and without electoral reform of about one-third
of the magnitude of the former. Hence, the magnitude of the treatment effects is bigger when consid-
ering endogenous selection than when ignoring it. However, the relative reaction of municipalities with
or without electoral reform is less pronounced than in Table 2, where the response for municipalities
with electoral reform was about three times as big as the one for municipalities without electoral reform
as of 2004. However, comparing the response across electoral regimes with endogenous selection, the
response of municipalities which have transitioned to the mayor-council system is roughly 50 per cent
larger than the response of municipalities which still operate under a council-manager system as of 2004
and generally also in previous years. The pattern holds under instrumental variable estimation and in
the generalized Heckman model.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here
In Table 5 we assess the sensitivity of these findings along the lines of inclusion of further covariates
in Xi t . In a first regression we extend the set of covariates by political variables which are the change
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in seats won by the four major parties in the local council (Social Democrat Party, Christian Democrat
Party, Liberal Party, and Green Party) before the equalization reform and the respective year after the re-
form. In a second exercise the extend the set of covariates by the change in the value-added tax revenue
of municipalities. As of 1997, municipalities lost authority to levy a tax on the stock of business capi-
tal (Gewerbekapitalsteuer) and, to compensate for the loss in revenue, receive a share of value-added
tax revenues since then. The variable "change in value-added tax income" controls for the impact the
change in the fiscal constitution of municipalities has on business tax rates. As can be inferred from
Table 5, the two sensitivity analyses leave the basic findings of the analysis intact, both in terms of the
magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical significance.
Insert Table 5 here
In a final exercise, we add a measure of equalizing transfer income to the regression equation (in
addition to the aforementioned covariates). A natural concern is that the equalization reform creates
changes in entitlement payments which may have caused the observed change in business tax rates.
Controlling for transfer income is a precarious exercise. Actual transfer income is endogenous and using
it as a explanatory variable would bias the results. We follow the approach by Gruber and Saez (2000) by
calculating a proxy for grants that is a function only of pre-reform behavior. That is, we compute transfers
a municipality would have received post-reform if its tax base and population size (co-determining the
need measure) were the same as in the pre-reform period, but the new formula was in place. Specifically,
we account for the new equalization rates, the new definition of the fiscal need measure, and the yearly
adjustment in the per-capita grant (Grundbetrag).12 To calculate the proxy, we use the population size
and fiscal capacity averaged over the pre-reform period 1995-97. Again, the basic findings remain intact,
showing that the change in the business tax rates across the different electoral regimes is related to the
change in the equalization rates.
7 Conclusion
This paper combines two strands of literature by analyzing how electoral rules affect incentive effects
of fiscal equalization systems. Key to the analysis are two reforms in the German state of Lower Saxony
12Fiscal need is defined as the product of population size, a qualifier which rises with population size, and a per-capita grant.
The latter is annually determined to balance the budget for equalizing transfers. The functional form of the qualifier changed
due to the reform. We hence calculate fiscal need as pre-reform population times the post-reform qualifier and the per-capita
grant of the respective year. Post-reform population may be endogenous to the reform and would potentially bias our results.
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which changed (i) the electoral rule under which the mayor is elected and (ii) the rate at which fiscal
deficiencies in fiscal wealth of municipalities are compensated. The most interesting result concerns the
adjustment in business tax rates over time. Municipalities which have transferred significant decision-
powers to the mayor appear to react more strongly to the equalization reform. The result points to the
more general issue of how responsive municipalities are to changes in the fiscal environment.
One motivation for the electoral reform was that the direct election of mayors was viewed by some
actors as a means of dealing with legislative "gridlock" in fragmented municipal councils and so of
speeding legislative response to fiscal problems. The empirical findings are consistent with this view.
An alternative rationale for the difference in results across electoral regimes is that the cost of taxation as
perceived by politicians is higher in a mayor-council system. For instance, council members may engage
in pork-barrel spending and only internalize the cost of public spending which falls onto the group the
legislator targets. The mayor, however, is elected under majoritarian rule which affects policy incentives
of the mayor. Given the difference in electoral systems, the mayor presumably internalize a larger share
of the overall costs of pork-barrel spending, with the consequence of reacting more strongly to changes
in the cost of taxation which follow, for instance, from a change in the equalization rate.
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Type of municipalities Percentage
Supplementary transfer eligibility 66,7
Electoral reform 38,7
Electoral reform & Supplementary transfer eligibility 25,9
Number
All observations 351
Table 1 - Electoral Reform and Supplementary Transfer Eligibility on 
Business Tax Rates in Lower Saxony (1999-2004)
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Figure 2 - Business Tax Rate Changes in Lower Saxony for Municipalities with and without Electoral Reform (1999-2004 relative to 1994-98)
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Table 2 - Effects of Supplementary Transfer Eligibility on Business Tax Rates in Lower Saxony for Municipalities with and without Electoral Reform (1999-2004)
(Exogenous treatment effect models)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,147 # -0,290 *** -0,349 *** -0,505 *** -0,353 ** -0,426 ***
0,094 0,096 0,096 0,130 0,144 0,140
Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,096 -0,103 -0,163 * -0,188 # -0,421 *** -0,381 ***
0,092 0,094 0,096 0,129 0,143 0,138
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 351
R2 0,045 0,055 0,061 0,064 0,051 0,064
Root mean squared error 0,759 0,779 0,792 1,061 1,181 1,144
Notes: Other control variables at the municipality level are the main effect of electoral reform, change population, population density, area of streets, share of elderly in
the population. ***, **, *, and # indicates significance of coefficients at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.    
Supplementary transfer eligibility as a determinant of business 
tax rates
Municipalities with electoral reform
Estimates are based on ordinary least squares
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Table 3 - Effects of Supplementary Transfer Eligibility on Business Tax Rates in Lower Saxony for Municipalities with and without Electoral Reform (1999-2004)
(Endogenous treatment effect models)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,222 -0,361 -0,373 -0,765 * -1,052 ** -0,978 **
0,297 0,294 0,295 0,440 0,479 0,477
Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,085 -0,094 -0,156 # -0,172 -0,391 *** -0,382 ***
0,095 0,096 0,098 0,132 0,144 0,138
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 351
R2 0,078 0,062 0,066 0,061 0,061 0,079
Root mean squared error 0,717 0,784 0,796 1,067 1,182 1,145
Joint significance of inverse Mills ratios (p-value) 0,399 0,426 0,335 0,765 0,092 0,062
Supplementary transfer eligibility as a determinant of business 
tax rates
Estimates are based on generalized Heckman models (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 608)
Municipalities with electoral reform
Notes: Other control variables at the municipality level are the main effect of electoral reform, change population, population density, area of streets, share of elderly
in the population. ***, **, *, and # indicates significance of coefficients at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.    
23
Table 4 - Effects of Supplementary Transfer Eligibility on Business Tax Rates in Lower Saxony for Municipalities with and without Electoral Reform (1999-2004)
(Endogenous treatment effect models)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Supplementary transfer eligibility 0,024 -0,126 -0,131 -0,707 * -1,141 ** -1,195 **
0,296 0,292 0,298 0,422 0,473 0,472
Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,183 # -0,172 -0,261 ** -0,218 -0,353 * -0,396 **
0,122 0,122 0,124 0,173 0,193 0,183
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 351
R2 0,028 0,044 0,061 0,050 0,088 0,115
Root mean squared error 0,768 0,789 0,792 1,070 1,244 1,203
Supplementary transfer eligibility as a determinant of business 
tax rates
Estimates are based on two-stage least squares models (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 621)
Municipalities with electoral reform
Notes: Other control variables at the municipality level are the main effect of electoral reform, change population, population density, area of streets, share of elderly
in the population. ***, **, *, and # indicates significance of coefficients at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.    
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Table 5 - Effects of Supplementary Transfer Eligibility on Business Tax Rates in Lower Saxony for Municipalities with and without Electoral Reform (1999-2004)
(Endogenous treatment effect models)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Benchmark (as in Table 4)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility 0,024 -0,126 -0,131 -0,707 * -1,141 ** -1,195 **
0,296 0,292 0,298 0,422 0,473 0,472
     Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,183 # -0,172 -0,261 ** -0,218 -0,353 * -0,396 **
0,122 0,122 0,124 0,173 0,193 0,183
Additional political controls (I)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility 0,112 -0,017 -0,087 -0,690 # -1,104 ** -1,167 **
0,296 0,294 0,305 0,427 0,473 0,474
     Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,210 * -0,204 ** -0,274 * -0,218 -0,354 * -0,395 **
0,124 0,126 0,126 0,175 0,193 0,184
Additional controls as in (I) plus value added tax (II)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility 0,108 -0,019 -0,070 -0,684 # -1,104 ** -1,179 **
0,298 0,294 0,308 0,436 0,480 0,480
     Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,212 * -0,211 * -0,268 ** -0,216 -0,355 * -0,399 **
0,124 0,125 0,126 0,173 0,191 0,182
Additional controls as in (II) plus income effect control (III)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility 0,125 0,040 -0,002 -0,683 # -1,158 ** -1,184 **
0,342 0,331 0,327 0,455 0,511 0,510
     Electoral reform × Supplementary transfer eligibility -0,187 # -0,200 # -0,261 ** -0,176 -0,338 * -0,379 **
0,126 0,127 0,126 0,170 0,189 0,180
Supplementary transfer eligibility as a determinant of business 
tax rates
Estimates are based on two-stage least squares models (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 621)
Notes: Control variables at the municipality level in the benchmark models are are the main effect of electoral reform, change population, population density, area of
streets, share of elderly in the population. ***, **, *, and # indicates significance of coefficients at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.    
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